The ‘Magnificent Seven’

In his latest memo ‘On Bubble Watch’, renowned investor Howard Marks discussed the phenomenon known as the ‘Magnificent Seven’ (hereafter M7) – Apple, Microsoft, Amazon, Alphabet (Google), Meta (Facebook), Nvidia, and Tesla – the popular US tech giants which have driven much of the S&P500’s performance in recent years. It’s well worth the read. I’ll highlight some of his comments below:

“My early brush with a genuine bubble caused me to formulate some guiding principles that carried me through the next 50-odd years:

It’s not what you buy, it’s what you pay that counts.

Good investing doesn’t come from buying good things, but from buying things well.

There’s no asset so good that it can’t become overpriced and thus dangerous, and there are few assets so bad that they can’t get cheap enough to be a bargain.”

“When something is on the pedestal of popularity, the risk of a decline is high.”

In the last 2 years, the average return of the M7 was 269% vs the S&P500’s 58%. Nvidia (+820%) skews that number somewhat: The median M7 stock ‘only’ returned 161%, still multiples ahead of the S&P500. It’s not unusual to find a group of outliers (typically identified after-the-fact), but what is unusual is that these 7 outliers are the 7 biggest listed companies in the world (by market capitalization), at the time of writing. When the outliers make up a third of the most popular index in the world, they cease to be outliers in the normal sense of the word.

These are undoubtedly some of the best businesses in the world, but the question is: Should we expect them to persistently outperform everything else? Should we be chasing them because of their superior returns? What about risk? And what do these stocks look like at an individual level?

As you consider the following data, keep Howard Marks’ comments above in mind.

At an aggregate level, the median price/earnings ratio (PE) of the M7 is 37x, while the median PE of the rest of the S&P500 is 22x. The long-term average PE of the S&P500 has been around 19x. The M7 trades at a premium of nearly 70% to the rest of the index, and nearly double the S&P500 long-term average. Individually, the M7 PE ratios are: Apple – 37x, Microsoft – 35x, Amazon – 45x, Alphabet – 25x, Meta – 27x, Nvidia – 53x, Tesla – 192x.

It’s worth noting that Nvidia – the star of the M7 – currently has net profit margins of ~55%, owing to insatiable demand for its powerful AI chips. This is double their long-term average, and double their peers. Margins like this attract competition, which eventually leads to lower margins. That’s a significant long-term risk that the market doesn’t seem to be concerned about at present.

The following graphs show how the total return (green line) of each of these stocks has developed relative to its sustainable return (blue line), along with a projected range (dotted lines) for future sustainable return based on a range of analyst estimates (high/consensus/low). The relationship between these 2 lines is that the sustainable return ultimately determines the path which total return follows. That doesn’t mean that total return can’t diverge dramatically from sustainable return for an extended period. Rather, extreme divergences are the hallmark of irrational/bubble-like behavior.

Apple:

Apple is well-ahead of its sustainable return, though not in classic bubble territory. Growth expectations are lower than the peer group, which suggests that Apple is priced for disappointing long-term returns.

Microsoft:

Microsoft is also well-ahead of its sustainable return, though growth is expected to be strong in coming years. Relative to consensus growth expectations, Microsoft is more reasonably priced than Apple.

Amazon:

Amazon is reasonably priced, though growth expectations have moderated relative to the past decade.

Alphabet (Google):

Alphabet is trading in-line with its sustainable return, with strong growth prospects. Google is the largest holding in most of our portfolios.

Meta (Facebook):

Meta is a very similar story to Alphabet. This is also one of our largest holdings.

Nvidia:

Nvidia has experienced dramatic growth in the last 2 years, but it’s total return has far outstripped its sustainable return. While still falling short of classic bubble extremes, the divergence between total return and sustainable return is very high and suggests disappointing future returns under all but the most optimistic scenarios.

Tesla:

Tesla exhibited typical bubble-like behavior between 2020 and 2022. We’ve seen a resurgence of this in 2024.

 

The ‘Magnificent Seven’ have dominated the investment landscape in recent years. They have an air of invincibility about them, and there’s a prevailing sense that their prices can only ever go up. But this isn’t the case: As recently as 2022, when the S&P500 declined 18%, the median M7 stock lost 50%. Regardless of how good the underlying business is, if the stock price becomes detached from sustainable return, it creates a very real risk of loss. This isn’t the case for every M7 constituent though. Rather than considering the group as a whole, it makes sense to assess the merits of each stock individually, as we do with the rest of our investible universe. This is why we hold large positions in Alphabet and Meta, but not the rest.

Investment Case: Apple

We sold out of our position in Apple in the 4th quarter of 2019. We bought most of our shares in 2016 between $90 and $120 for a total return of roughly 140% in just over 3 years. While Apple has been a phenomenal investment for us, and it remains an excellent business by our estimation, we think the valuation has raced ahead of the underlying business fundamentals.

In this Investment Case post we put Apple through our process and demonstrate why we bought in 2016, and why we sold at the end of 2019.1

The Causality of Return

While many investments are made on the basis of predictions, narratives, or statistical correlations, our process is based on the causality of return, which is defined by the following mathematical identity:

Return = Yield + Growth + Revaluation = Sustainable Return + Revaluation

This identity forms the foundation of our investment philosophy and process, so we’ve written about it on several occasions here, here, here and here.

Sustainable Return

The iPhone has been one of the most successful and profitable consumer products in history. Over the last 20 years Apple has delivered real sustainable returns of >20% p.a. driven primarily by rapid growth in revenues, but as the company has matured sustainable return has become less growth oriented and increasingly driven by return of capital to shareholders.

This form of sustainable return is constrained by a combination of profitability and valuation. At current prices Apple yields 1%, but repurchases about 5% of their shares each year. We think it is unlikely that Apple will be able to sustain this rate of share buybacks for very long at the current price.

Our future expectations for overall sustainable return are ~9% in real terms – still very healthy.

In 2016 we had a slightly more conservative sustainable return assumption at ~8%, owing mostly to lower Growth assumptions.

Revaluation

Since we’re measuring Sustainable Return in terms of revenues, we need to do the same with Revaluation. To this end we need to determine a “fair” Price/Sales ratio and compare it to the current multiple.

Price/Sales = Net Margin x Price/Earnings

According to Bloomberg, analysts expect Apple’s net margins to be around 19%. We think this is a reasonable base-case assumption.

Apple currently trades at 27x earnings, a high multiple that requires healthy growth to be justified. Over the last decade Apple’s median PE has been 15.5x, though we’re happy to work on an exit PE of 18.5x as reasonable.

18.5 PE x 19% Margin = 3.5 Price/Sales which is 34% below Apple’s current 5.3x revenue multiple. If we annualize this over 7 years, our Revaluation assumption becomes -6.4% p.a.2

In 2016 our fair Price/Sales estimate was 3.1x, primarily owing to a more conservative exit PE multiple. This compared favourably to the prevailing multiple of 2.4x at the time, implying Revaluation of +3.8% p.a. annualized over 7 years.

Total Return

The following graph shows how Apple’s Sustainable Return (blue) and Total Return (green) have developed over time. The dotted blue line shows where Sustainable Return would go at a rate 9% p.a. (real) for 7 years:

The yellow circle indicates where we originally bought Apple, while the red indicates where we sold.

Total Return = Sustainable Return + Revaluation

In 2016, our conservative Total Return expectation was 8% + 3.8% = 11.8% p.a. in real terms (~14% p.a. in nominal USD terms).

Actual Sustainable Return was slightly higher than our expectations (9.5% p.a. vs 8% in real terms). Revaluation, on the other hand, completely overshot, as is often the case since valuations are so volatile and unpredictable in the short-term. This provided us with an opportunity to earn what we would have been satisfied to earn over 7 years, in just more than 3.

Today, our base-case Total Return expectation is 9% – 6.4% = 2.6% p.a. in real terms (~4.8% p.a. in nominal USD terms).

Good Quality

Apple remains a high quality business. It is consistently profitable, and though it has raised some debt in recent years it still has very strong financials and cash flows.

Profitability is a most important driver of sustainable return over time – it determines the trajectory. A profit can be returned to shareholders in the form of Yield or reinvested in the business for organic per-share Growth. Yield and Growth are the two constituents of Sustainable Return. Absent consistent profits, few businesses can deliver high Sustainable Return over long periods of time. No problems here for Apple.

Financial Strength is the second most important driver of Sustainable Return over time. It doesn’t say much about the trajectory, but it says a lot about the riskiness of the business and the probability of a sudden, steep decline in Sustainable Return should the business run into financial difficulty.

Apple has raised $100bn in debt since 2012 when it had none. This represents <10% of the market cap of Apple and doesn’t present much risk at this stage.

What is more of an issue is that the valuation of Apple at 27x earnings places a constraint on the sustainability of Apple’s share repurchase program. Apple’s balance sheet will come under pressure if buybacks continue at a rate of 5% p.a. at these valuations. This wasn’t an issue in 2016 when the stock traded at 12x PE. This means less Sustainable Return potential from Yield.

Probabilities vs Possibilities

In 2016 Apple traded on a 12x PE. It subsequently returned 140%, well beyond our expectations and trades on a PE of 27x. This valuation is expensive in absolute terms and relative to Apple’s own history. This valuation also constrains Apple’s ability to generate Sustainable Return through return of capital to shareholders, making future returns heavily dependent on Growth.

While higher returns are obviously possible for Apple, we believe our inputs to be a reasonable base-case. Anything is possible, and there is a range of likely outcomes rather than one specific outcome set in stone. But investors should be concerned with probabilities, not possibilities. In the case of Apple, the probabilities favour low returns over the next 5 to 10 years.

As always, the way to think about this is not to try and predict the future for this one stock, but to ask whether you would invest in a portfolio of 50 stocks with the same preconditions. If the answer is no for the 50, it should be no for the one too.

 

1 Note that this is just a high-level overview of a more thorough analysis.

2 Technically, Return = Growth + Yield + Revaluation x (1 + Growth), but since the Growth interaction with the Revaluation term is usually quite small, we just group it into Revaluation for the sake of simplicity. Our calculations always factor this interaction in though.

Investment Case: Netflix

Over the last decade, Netflix, the world’s largest online TV subscription service, has grown its revenues roughly 10 times, its earnings per share 15 times and its share price nearly 100 times. Netflix has become a household name and an investor favourite, earning its place among the market’s most high-flying tech stocks, the FAANGs.

But should investors expect the performance of the last decade to persist? In our first Investment Case post we put Netflix through our process and try to make an investment case for the stock.1

The Causality of Return

While many investments are made on the basis of predictions, narratives, or statistical correlations, our process is based on the causality of return, which is defined by the following mathematical identity:

Return = Yield + Growth + Revaluation = Sustainable Return + Revaluation

This identity forms the foundation of our investment philosophy and process, so we’ve written about it on several occasions here, here, here and here.

While this framework can be applied in many different ways, one useful application is to identify companies where optimistic assumptions nevertheless result in weak returns, or where conservative assumptions result in strong returns. We believe Netflix falls into the former category.

Sustainable Return

Netflix is a high sustainable return business, and most of the investment cases in favour of Netflix are based on the premise that this will continue.

According to Bloomberg, analysts expect Netflix’s per share revenues to grow between 15% and 20% p.a. over the next 7 years. While this growth rate is slower than in recent years, it is normal for any high growth company to start tapering off as the base effects kick in.

Netflix doesn’t pay a dividend, so we would suggest that 20% p.a. is an optimistic estimate for Sustainable Return over the next 7 years. We’ll revisit this assumption shortly.

Revaluation

Since we’re measuring Sustainable Return in terms of revenues, we need to do the same with Revaluation. To this end we need to determine a “fair” Price/Sales ratio and compare it to the current multiple.

Price/Sales = Net Margin x Price/Earnings

According to Bloomberg, analysts expect Netflix’s net margins to reach mid-teens within 5 years. This is in the ballpark for peer companies, but well ahead of Netflix’s own historic margins, which have averaged less than 5% over the last decade. Margins have reached nearly 9% in 2011 and again in 2018. We think a 15% normal net margin is a generous assumption to make at this stage.

Netflix currently trades at 106x earnings, a demanding multiple that requires significant revenue and margin growth to be justified. As growth and margins mature in years to come, it is reasonable to assume a lower exit PE. We’d consider 25x to be optimistic. This number is well above norms for more mature companies, even in the tech space.

25 PE x 15% Margin = 3.75 Price/Sales which is nearly 60% lower than Netflix’s current 8.9x revenue multiple. If we annualize this over 7 years, our Revaluation assumption becomes -14% p.a.2

Total Return

The following graph shows how Netflix’s Sustainable Return (blue) and Total Return (green) have developed over time. The dotted blue line shows where Sustainable Return would go if it grows at 20% p.a. for 7 years:

NFLX

If this somewhat optimistic scenario plays out and Netflix trades at 3.75x revenue, Total Return will be 6% per annum.

Total Return = Sustainable Return + Revaluation = 20% – 14% = 6% p.a.

6% p.a. is somewhat shy of the ~56% p.a. return delivered by Netflix over the last decade, but remember that Netflix’s PE ratio a decade ago was around 18x vs 106x today and growth was higher.

We doubt many Netflix bulls would be happy with 6%. Presumably they would assume higher growth, margins and/or exit PEs, which would be necessary to deliver a higher return, or otherwise they’re overlooking one of the causal drivers of return.

What about Financial Strength?

Let’s revisit that earlier Sustainable Return assumption, because we haven’t considered two of the most important causal drivers of Sustainable Return: Profitability and Financial Strength. We cannot simply rely only on analyst forecasts in this regard. We need to understand whether the causal preconditions of high Sustainable Return are present or not.

Profitability is a most important driver of sustainable return over time – it determines the trajectory. A profit can be returned to shareholders in the form of Yield or reinvested in the business for organic per-share Growth. Yield and Growth are the two constituents of Sustainable Return. Absent consistent profits, few businesses can deliver high Sustainable Return over long periods of time. Netflix has been consistently profitable since 2004, so no problems there at face-value.

Financial Strength is the second most important driver of Sustainable Return over time. It doesn’t say much about the trajectory, but it says a lot about the riskiness of the business and the probability of a sudden, steep decline in Sustainable Return should the business run into financial difficulty.

In this regard we have two concerns about Netflix:

  1. Despite declaring consistent profits, free cash flows have been negative as Netflix has invested heavily in new content to drive subscriptions. Profits absent cash flows are a red flag;
  2. Netflix has recently returned to the bond market, increasing their debt pile to $10.4 billion, no doubt to fund new content for which they actually need cash. While $10.4 billion is only ~8% of Netflix’s current market cap, remember that this is based on a valuation of 106x earnings. If that multiple was 20x, debt would be 40% of market cap, which is significant. What if they burn through that cash? Will they keep returning to the bond market?

These concerns over Netflix’s financial position indicate significant downside risk to our already optimistic 20% p.a. Sustainable Return assumption.

Probabilities vs Possibilities

A decade ago Netflix traded on a 18x PE and had no debt. It subsequently returned 56% p.a. as it blew past expectations and rose to ever higher valuations.

Today the company is on 106x PE and has significant debt, with no free cash flow in sight. Valuations are higher, growth is likely to be lower than in the past, and financial risks to the growth outlook are far more significant. These causal preconditions are vastly different (and less favourable) than what they were a decade ago.

While returns higher than 6% p.a. are obviously possible for Netflix, we believe our inputs to be an optimistic base-case. Anything is possible, and there is a range of likely outcomes rather than one specific outcome set in stone. But investors should be concerned with probabilities, not possibilities. It is quite possible (perhaps even probable) for growth, margins and PE to be lower than our estimates, in which case return would be lower too. In the case of Netflix, the probabilities seem to favour disappointing outcomes over the next decade.

A good way to think about this is what Jim O’Shaughnessy describes as Base Rates. If you invest in 100 stocks with similar preconditions, some of them would do well, but how often would the overall portfolio outperform and by how much? Since these preconditions speak directly to the causality of return, we’d suggest not very often, and not by very much.

Ask yourself: What return would you be happy with from Netflix? What assumptions would need to hold to deliver that return? Are those assumptions probable? Are they conservative? What would the base rate look like for a portfolio of 100 stocks with the same preconditions? If the base rate isn’t good for the 100, is it worth speculating on the 1?

 

1 Note that this is just a high-level overview of a more thorough analysis.

2 Technically, Return = Growth + Yield + Revaluation x (1 + Growth), but since the Growth interaction with the Revaluation term is usually quite small, we just group it into Revaluation for the sake of simplicity. Our calculations always factor this interaction in though.